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Information Operations 
 
Dr. Kathryn Aten 
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Dr. Marco DiRenzo 
Summary 
Note: This report was prepared prior to Marine leaders’ de-establishment of IO as a doctrinal term. 
The survey and interview responses use the term IO. The authors have revised the report, where 
possible to avoid the use of IO. However, the term remains in quotes and survey responses.  
 
How to best manage information warfighting talent is a “wicked” problem, which the Marines are 
addressing in an ongoing process. This study better defines the problem, identifies salient issues, and 
provides evidence to inform future actions in the ongoing process. 
 
Specialized occupations, because of their small size and unique skill requirements, offer status and 
association with an elite community. However, these very characteristics pose challenges for talent 
management. This mixed-method study investigated drivers of occupational and organizational 
commitment among information warfighters and explored the factors that influence the 
development of information warfighting expertise.  
 
Overall, the analysis shows that information warfighters do not attain expertise by the end of their 
tour. Information warfighters are committed to the Marines but less so to the information 
warfighting occupation. Enlisted Marines with a PsyOps MOS scored higher on occupational 
commitment than IO officers, who lack an information warfighting career path. These findings 
support the theory that the degree to which Marines perceive they are promotable drives 
occupational commitment to information warfighting, which in turn, drives their desire to remain in 
the occupation, which impacts the time available for developing information warfighting skills. To 
support the short-term development of information warfighting expertise, leaders should create a 
promotability feedback loop: design a professional pipeline; leverage pride in mission to build pride in 
the profession and increase commitment; improve information warfighting skill development and 
knowledge sharing; and improve the selection process. In the long term, information warfighting 
skills should be strengthened within Command leadership. 
 
Winter 2019 




Military information power and the MAGTF a  
The Marine Corps is facing an evolving future operating environment and force transformation 
that will entail significant changes to the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF).1 To address 
future needs, the Commandant details a vision centered on three concepts: distributed operations, 
literal operations in the contested environment, and expeditionary advanced base operations.2 
The effectiveness of the Marine Corps’ in the future operating environment will require a robust 
command and control (C2) system that is integrated with naval operations and the joint world.3 
In order to improve the effectiveness of C2, Operations in the Information Environment (OIE) 
was created to help unify network operations, oversee upgrades to the technical infrastructure, 





The MAGTF OIE has seven core functions associated with improving the effectiveness of C2 
(See Figure 1).6 These functions include assuring critical systems, providing battlespace 
awareness, exploiting networks, informing, influencing, and deceiving audiences and controlling 
information warfare resources. In order to achieve these functions, OIE is structured into six 
capability areas: Cyberspace, Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS), Inform Operations, Space 
Operations, Influence Operations, and Deception Operations. Within these capabilities, there are 
seven Information Related Capabilities (IRC’s), that allow OIE to achieve success in the core 
functions. 
  
Recent research at the Naval Postgraduate School indicates two concerning issues with the 
training of OIE personnel. Using a combination of multiple choice questions, scenario responses, 
surveys/interviews, and observations of military exercises, the authors evaluated gaps in 
knowledge and comprehension and shortfalls in operational procedures and behaviors.  
 
1 This report describes a study conducted by NPS faculty. Appendix A details the research methods. 
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First, the authors found that after three years OIE 
officers are not fully trained for their jobs.7 The 
study found that across the Marine Corps 
information warfighting function (IWF), there is 
only a minimum understanding of the three primary 
Information Related Capabilities (IRC’s)— 
Military Information Support Operations (MISO), 
Electronic Warfare (EW), and Military Deception 
(MILDEC.) The study also found that the entry-
level MOS training is not reinforced or maintained 
in the operating forces. Only 20% of those tested 
comprehended basic IO principles or were 
proficient by the end of their three year OIE tour. 
The authors conclude that OIE forces only attain 
comprehension of MISO, EW, and MILDEC at 
the time they are required to transition back to their primary military occupation  (PMOS).8   
This finding is confirmed by our survey which shows low levels of self-reported expertise. 
41.3% rate themselves as below 5 (out of 10) in their level of expertise. And, the majority of 
respondents felt that their training does not prepare them for their role (See Figure 2)   
 
Second, the study found that because there is no PMOS, there are few command opportunities in 
OIE. The current command process limits the promotability of OIE personnel because there is no 
domain-expert career path. Only 2.4% of colonels in fields that do not have a domain-expert 
career path were promoted because promotion is not possible absent holding a lieutenant colonel 
command.9 The Commandant has recognized the dysfunctional impact of manpower policies 
and called for changes in how the Marine Corps manages talent.  
Talent Management in a VUCA world 
In the influential book, ‘Leaders Make the Future: Ten New Leadership Skills for an Uncertain 
World,’ Bob Johansen discusses both the dangers and opportunities facing leadership in today’s 
world where volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA) reign. Leaders must do 
more than respond to chaos, they need tools to “help them turn volatility into vision, uncertainty 
into understanding, complexity into clarity and ambiguity into agility.”10 For the military, this 
indicates the need for a hybrid approach to warfare that includes conventional capabilities and 
irregular tactics such as diplomacy, politics, and anti-terrorist and anti-criminal actions. Hybrid 
warfare is characterized by a convergence of activities designed to address the VUCA world. 
Hybrid warfare is “…characterized by a convergence [of] physical and psychological, kinetic 
and non-kinetic, combatants and noncombatants… and the operational fusion of conventional 
and irregular approaches.”11 OIE is a key lever in fusing these conventional and irregular 
approaches to warfare. Hybrid warfare requires Marines who can assess these combinations and 
integrate military actions across many disciplines. Further, as the Marine Corps transforms, all 










1 2 3 4 5
Disagree                                                Agree






The 2017 MAGTF Ground Operations document summarizes the role of information operations  
as the ability to “modify the behavior, influence the decisions, or support the actions of friendly, 
neutral, and hostile actors.12” At the lower end of the conflict continuum, information operations 
are often the primary means of producing effects in a volatile and uncertain operational 
environment. Because of this volatility, the information warfighting function requires a complex 
set of skills for analyzing the environment that includes the “assessment and analysis of the 
cultural, political, social, and economic factors that influence the objectives and behaviors of key 
actors in a conflict.”13 To support this mission, the Marine Corps must develop a talent 
management system for the IO billet that delivers the force that is needed to meet current 
challenges.  
Talent Management for OIE 
This mixed-method study investigated drivers of occupational and organizational commitment 
among information operations warfighters and explored the factors impacting the development 
of expertise in the IO billet. An analysis of interviews informed a literature review, the literature 
review elaborated the interview findings, and a survey confirmed the findings with a broader 
sample. 
 
Our findings show that an effective OIE requires a level of proficiency that goes beyond 
traditional warfighting skills. To be proficient at information operations one must perform “as a 
combination of creative thinking and advanced technology.”14 This level of proficiency requires 
a portfolio of competencies, which can be acquired by selecting the right people, developing 
processes for skill building, driving commitment, and building a professional pipeline. 
Select the right people 
Marines entering OI billets require three core competencies: technical expertise, critical thinking 
and human skills. These competencies are in alignment with published research on the core 





Technical expertise in OIE encompasses the six primary and overlapping IRC’s 
(see Figure 1). In our interviews, participants noted two challenges with selecting 
and integrating these capabilities. First, recruitment of generalists and people without 
prior experience in the core IRC’s may lead to diminished expertise: “Yeah, we 
integrated something, but it’s not our field of expertise … and we bottleneck everything…[so] 
not all the right information is getting to the Commanding Officer like it used to where you have 
the expert in the room.” Expertise is not only compromised for the new IO assignment, but for 
the departing command as well. When officers return to their primary MOS, knowledge is lost: 










“A lot of the nuances of the very technical aspects of our MOS, different weapons 
characteristics, different tactics, different historical examples, some of those have kind of faded a 
little bit… I can’t access them as readily as I used to be able to so I could make a better 
decision.”  
 
Second, Unrestricted Line Officers are often selected based on technical background and not on 
their interest or aptitude in the IO billets: “I called the Monitor (about a discrepancy in orders) 
… He said it really doesn't matter, ‘You didn't ask to be in either one of them, so just take a 
pick’… I had to give an immediate response. And I had no opportunity to really research it at all. 
I just said, ‘Sure, that field sounds neat’.” Research shows that low occupational commitment 
such as that resulting from career powerlessness can negatively affect performance.16 
 
Critical thinking is another core competency that OIE professionals require. Both 
enlisted and officers agreed that OIE requires the ability to integrate diverse 
knowledge and environments and to think holistically: “We operate in a different 
realm now. I’m not worried about do I have to kill a bad guy. I’m worried about what happens 
after I kill the bad guy or before I kill [the] guy or during the killing of the bad guy, right. Or if 
there’s other people. It's not just the adversary. It’s the friendlies, neutrals, right. What are the 
consequences to all our actions, and can I mitigate any of those consequences? Can I influence 
anyone that provides a command or tactical advantage?” 
 
Human skills make up the final core competency that are required by information 
warfighting professionals. Human skills include the ability to understand the social 
environment and stakeholders, the ability to lead and influence, and emotional and 
organizational intelligence. As one participant stated: “The big skills and qualities I 
think you need are, one, in understanding other people, good emotional intelligence to 
understand that other people don't always think the way you do, whether they're friendly or 
enemy or neutral or your own staff. And you have to be a good staff officer too. You have to be a 
good part of the team because if the IO planner wants to be a part of the MAGTF and support 
the MAGTF, he has to be working with the rest of the MAGTF. So good a good grasp of Marine 
Corps operations is important to be a Marine Corps IO officer.” 
 
Selection criteria for the information warfighting community should include  
technical expertise, critical thinking, and human skills. For instance, for enlisted OIE personnel, 
the addition of a primary MOS for PsyOps has led to a more targeted selection process. This 
process includes well-developed screening that accounts for the full range of required abilities 
and also allows for advancement. As one participant noted: “We’ve got a pretty good extensive 
screening process. You know, communication skills, verbal, written, you know, face-to-face 
interview, that kind of thing. And then once you select that Marine, then you train him, and then 
he lateral moves into this new MOS.” 
 
Katz, in 2009, proposes a developmental pathway for developing these three skills that is 
structured to address the needs at varying levels of responsibility.17 In this framework, technical 
skill is indispensable to efficient operations. It has the greatest importance at the lower levels of 
responsibility and is least relevant at the top of the management chain. Human skills are 
important at all leadership levels but become more important with increasing leadership 
responsibility (which entails more interpersonal interactions). Finally, conceptual skills become 
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increasingly important as responsibility increases and are essential at the highest levels of 
leadership. When strategy formulation and decision-making are key or where leaders can 
leverage the human and technical skills of others, the conceptual skills come to the forefront. 
Develop Skills 
The development of professional skills and knowledge occurs through formal education and 
through social learning, which includes on-the job-experience, sharing lessons learned, and 




Our survey indicates that all four methods of skill development are important to current 
personnel in the IO billet, and that on-the job experience is ranked highest for all. The value of 
talent development is recognized as particularly important for those who have acquired a high 
level of expertise. Our interviews with OIE personnel support the notion that formal education 
for information warfare professionals in the Marine Corps can be improved and indicate that 





Formal education serves an important role in developing job proficiency for the 
information warfighting professional. Bloom’s taxonomy outlines six levels of skill 
formation: knowledge, comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis, and 
evaluation18. Classroom training for the IO billet focuses on the first two of these. 
However, the higher order skills in this environment are developed over time and through 















High expertise workers value knowledge sharing 
High Expertise
Others
Recommendations for skill development: 
• Create a tiered set of short courses targeted to increasing levels of decision-making 
(in process) 
• Leverage Joint and Army training opportunities 
• Strengthen soft skill development (e.g. cultural awareness, communication skills, 
team building, leadership and management) 
• Create a professional framework that supports group learning (e.g. integration into 
ITX, group simulations) 
• Increase experiential learning by creating long term career opportunities (e.g. 
primary MOS, lateral transfers, refinement of promotion criteria)  
• Strengthen knowledge sharing structures (e.g. knowledge management systems, 




going to get that if you have all these great people coming in, getting all this high value 
education then getting two to three years of experience actually applying it…this would be fine if 
this was something that wasn't being called out as a major capability that needs to be integrated 
into the total force.”   
 
As noted previously, recent research has identified gaps in formal IO training in the Marine 
Corps and suggests that substantial changes be implemented to improve effectiveness. Our study 
participants identified several additional areas for improvement in the information warfighting 
educational processes, many of which are underway. First, the current offering of short courses is 
not targeted for varying levels of responsibility and rank: “You have a school where you could 
have anything between an E4 to a full bird Colonel, an O6, in the same class getting taught the 
same material at the same pace when an O6 has a certain level of experience and expectations of 
what he should be getting out of his education as opposed to an E4. And, obviously, an E4 
doesn't have the ability a to make decisions when an O6 does.” Second, the education of OI 
Planners primarily focuses on developing technical skills when ‘soft’ skills are deemed to be 
equally, if not more, important: “But since I’ve been here, I’ve become smarter, especially 
through the graduate process, the writing and critically thinking…the knowledge of local 
culture… psychology type courses about different biases and how to reach people…I’ve 
definitely seen that I’ve become better at those things, and I think those are skills that I’m going 
to be able to apply.”  
 
Knowledge sharing is a key factor in developing professional capability and often 
occurs through social learning processes. Gardner and colleagues discuss three types 
of knowledge sharing—relational, experiential, and structural—that are key to 
developing expertise19. Currently in OIE, knowledge sharing is limited and 
participants perceive that the lack of a robust knowledge sharing system negatively affects 
performance. 
 
Relational knowledge sharing is focused on team relationships. This type of knowledge sharing 
occurs when team members work together and are familiar with each other. Relational 
knowledge sharing allows team members to locate knowledge within a group and share that 
knowledge among group members. Sharing mutual knowledge, using a shared vocabulary, and 
creating a professional framework can make a team more efficient and allow for open 
information exchange, a better understanding of needs, and increased trust. Relational knowledge 
sharing also enhances team performance by improving group collaboration, communication, and 
joint problem solving.20 Interestingly, our survey shows that those with high levels of expertise 
rate this form of knowledge sharing significantly more important than those with lower levels of 
expertise (See Figure 3 above). 
 
Participants noted the importance of working closely with other IO professionals: “As a 
coordinator, it’s important to develop the relationships with the individuals that are in that unit 




















that room, I already have a network of people that I can go to. And that, I think, is going to be 
huge.”  
 
Because OIE tours are generally constrained to 2-3 years and the opportunities for combat 
experience are limited, the opportunities for building a professional community are also limited: 
“Until just these last few recent months, there was less than 1% of the personnel who had any 
previous IO experience and tour (not counting the civilians.) So, you’re always on that first three 
year learning curve.” 
 
As one pilot described, however, relational knowledge sharing can improve performance: “As a 
pilot, once you get far enough along, you start critiquing yourself. You can tell the senior pilots: 
‘Hey, I did this well, this well, this well, but I screwed up X, Y, Z,’ and they kind of give you little 
steers on the techniques that have been helpful for them.” 
 
Experiential knowledge sharing is defined as “collective work experience and training.”21 This 
type of sharing is focused on collective knowledge in an ongoing process of mutual learning, 
where team members integrate their accumulated practical skills. In our survey, those with the 
most expertise found this form of knowledge sharing very useful (See Figure 3). The integration 
of knowledge allows individuals to perform more smoothly and efficiently and improves 
organizational performance.22 Strategic management research demonstrates how experiential 
knowledge sharing can improve organizational performance. By integrating resources such as 
alliances, products, and strategic decision-making sooner, smarter, and at the right time, 
organizations can create resources that have advantages over their competition.23 As one 
participant explained, experiential knowledge sharing in information warfighting is limited by 
the lack of a deep bench of expertise: “So the person I could ask was a guy who had graduated 
his school six months before me. So, there was no basket of experience that I could reach into.” 
 
Structural information sharing focuses on how knowledge is concentrated or disbursed within 
a team. For example, the placement of information warfighting professionals in the MAGTF and 
the colocation of complementary IRC’s can increase team coordination: “The PAO sat behind 
me at her desk so I could coordinate with her. And then the Civil Affairs guy was right there too. 
Yeah.” However, structural knowledge sharing is limited for IO officers and this can negatively 
affect performance. One participant offered this explanation: “OIE can still be successful, but 
your successes will be limited. You don't have the depth of knowledge and the expertise—the 
people who can do really substantial writing and developing of the doctrine and the practice. 
There are lessons learned that are out there, but I would challenge you to find anything that talks 
about best practices that is kind of vetted and validated and put out there within the service. It 
just doesn't exist.” Our survey indicates that those that have the most expertise find Lessons 
Learned to be a significant contributor to gaining expertise (See Figure 3). 
 
The short tenure of OIE professionals also contributes to capability gaps by limiting continuity: 
“When officers leave, they go back to their primary MOS....How are we going to get better as an 
IO community? How are we going to get better as the Marine Corps if we don't capitalize on the 
knowledge, the human capital, the talent?”  Our survey indicates that 52% of professionals in 
the IO billet have less than 1 year of experience, with nearly 87% having less than 3 years. All 
respondents felt that it takes nearly four years to become an expert and experts believe that it 




          






Enlisted OIE personnel, however, have a primary MOS in PsyOps. By professionalizing the 
workforce, Enlisted PsyOps personnel have less perceived impediments to promotion and see 
their information warfighting position as career enhancing (see Figure 6). This has allowed them 
to develop formalized structures for knowledge sharing. In particular they have created a 
knowledge management system focused on professional development, which is tied to the 
recognition of PSYOPS as a profession: “I wanted to know what’s the latest and greatest on 
these deployments; what are the lessons learned; are there any new updated doctrine or policies 
or publications that are out there; is there any good reading I should be catching up on; what's 
the latest on the Marine Corps’ stance on PSYOP? Those are all the questions the Marines ask… 









































































   
   
   
   
   
   












Research tells us that commitment is a primary antecedent of job proficiency.24 Commitment 
helps build capability by increasing the effectiveness of formal training and knowledge sharing 
and by improving retention (and therefore time available for developing job skills). Our 
interviews indicate that among information warfighting professionals there is a strong 




Commitment is defined as “…a mind-set that can take different forms and binds an individual to 
a course of action that is relevant to a particular target.”25 Commitment is a frame of mind that 
drives behavior and includes: affective commitment, 
continuance commitment, and normative commitment. 
Affective commitment is the emotional attachment 
one has to a specific entity. Continuance commitment 
refers to the perceived costs associated with leaving an 
entity. And, normative commitment is the feeling of 
obligation that one feels to an entity.26 Research 
shows that affective commitment has the strongest 
positive correlation with job performance, organi-
zational citizenship behavior, and attendance,  
followed by normative commitment. The target of 
these mindsets can be an individual, group, or action.  
 
In this study, we explored both organizational and occupational commitment. Organizational 
commitment is defined as the emotional attachment that one has to an organization. In the case 
of OIE, there are two levels of organizational commitment—the Marine Corps and OIE. 
Occupational commitment is the attachment that one feels towards one’s profession or vocation. 
For the current study occupational commitment refers to the information warfighting profession. 
 
Organizational commitment among participants is generally high toward the 
Marine Corps and low toward the IO billet (See Figure 8). Being a Marine is a core 
part of their identity and community and doing “what is best for the Marine Corps” 
is of key importance: “I was 19 years old the first time I engaged the enemy in 
combat, you know, and then follow-on operations and deployments. Yeah, I mean, that's 
something that will shape me forever, right. It’s part of my fingerprint.” 
 
Recommendations for increasing occupational commitment: 
• Increase	opportunities	for	promotion	within	IO	billet	(normative)	















A strong organizational commitment can affect an employee’s work ethic and their commitment 
to both mission and community. For example, a pilot explained how his calling to the air 
community affected his commitment and functioning: “I love being a pilot. I love flying. I love 
being in a squadron. I love working with the Marines in the squadron… I didn't mind going to 
work each day… I love having Marines that I work with and work for and understanding 
how everything about how the aircraft works to the maintenance side of it and all the 
administrative stuff that keeps a squadron functional and successful.”  
 
Participants’ responses suggest that when organizational commitment to the Marine Corps is 
aligned with the goals of information warfighting, OIE professionals are more committed to their 
work. Participants that perceived information warfighting as a form of combat expressed 
attraction to the field. “I had a general understanding of what Information Operations was. And, 
you know, anything to mess with the enemy is great in my mind, right. I've fought bad enemies in 
the Middle East. I know how these people think and work. So, anything to mess with them or 
harass them, kill them efficiently, quickly, beat them on the battlefield, I'm a big fan of.” 
 
However, participants that did not perceive information warfighting as aligned with the mission, 
viewed OIE as irrelevant. A few participants felt that the new institution is redundant and 
unnecessary as a specialized combat group. Others stressed the importance of connecting OIE 
with the Marine Corps mission: “I think we need to calibrate our expectations to what the 
purpose of the Marine Corps is. And that can get lost in a field like Information Operations. And 
I’ve seen it almost day one when I stepped foot in MCIOC. The Marine Corps is built to project 
power from the sea, to establish a hold in a littoral environment, and to go stick a bayonet in the 
enemy as quick as possible. Anything that doesn't enhance our ability to, you know, be maritime 
soldiers of the sea needs to go away.”  
 
Participants’ responses suggest that when this mission alignment is not recognized, it is harder 
for information warfighting personnel to identify and connect to the Marine Corps ethos and 
community. The Marine ethos is based on observable effects and it can often be difficult to 
establish clear measurable effects in the information warfighting realm: “So the effects of IO are 
not always tangible or not always immediately seen or immediately experienced in a successful 
way. So, for example, if I engaged the enemy with large caliber ammunition and I see them fall, 
then I know I've won, and I can go back and plan for the next one, celebrate. IO doesn't always 















   
   
   
   
   
   
   












Finally, because OIE is new, there are a many newly structured processes and accompanying 
uncertainty about the organization. These challenges offer opportunity and yet are frustrating: 
“In all this uncertainty, you still have people who want to do the right thing and try to figure it 
out…We have an optimistic, bright future in IO because we have smart people and great people 
tackling these hard problems—we may not know what we're dealing with right now, it’s like I'm 
trying to hold Jell-O.” 
 
By aligning and communicating the OIE mission with the broader purpose of the Marine Corps, 
OIE can strengthen the organizational commitment to information warfighting groups. 
 
 
Occupational commitment varies for the OIE organization, depending on rank, 
but is generally low (See Figure 9). Even though we do see that investing in a proxy 
career (Enlisted PsyOps) may increase commitment, the commitment is normative 
(feeling that they ought to stay out of a sense of duty). While stronger commitment is 
good, it's troublesome that the affective commitment scores trail behind. Our interviews indicate 
that part of the attraction to OIE is because it does not impede promotion, and this may partially 
explain the higher normative commitment scores. Officers, however, saw OIE as a collateral 





OIE enlisted are trained in a new MOS (PsyOps) which they value because of the increased 
responsibility and opportunities for career advancement. Many enlisted come from office jobs 
that are dull and far removed from combat effects. The enlisted are also selected (and rewarded) 
based on accumulated MOS skill sets—working in a secondary MOS is not perceived to 
negatively impact their promotability. The combination of rewards and empowerment may lead 
to a stronger affective commitment in enlisted personnel: “I'm empowered. I have the capability 
to apply critical thought to the problem set just like any other human being. And I'm being 
entrusted to do so. That's a huge selling point for the enlisted Marines. And, to me, that was one 
of the big selling points; that I’m not looked at as an enlisted Marine; I'm looked at as a Marine 
with a capability or a skill set, and I'm entrusted to do the right thing.” 
 
Enlisted participants also believe that they are likely to be more readily promoted from an OIE 











   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
















promote is enhanced for the enlisted because their promotion boards are perceived as valuing 
diverse assignments and because their most common MOS (PsyOps) is now a primary MOS. 
“For an enlisted, it’s not very difficult. It’s a lot easier to massage and manage enlisted talent 
management. Because the enlisted force is so large, they’re a lot more malleable. …We've had 
Marines from the fleet come back and go, “Yes, I would like to come back to this occupational 
field and make this a career.” But before that, like I said, talent management did not exist for 
this specific MOS (PSYOPS).” 
 
Officers, however, exhibit less occupational commitment to the information warfighting 
profession. Responses suggest that the lack of commitment derives from promotion obstacles, a 
lack of calling, and poor selection processes. Promotion opportunities are limited for officers 
because OIE is not a primary MOS nor is it seen as relevant to related MOS’s such as 
Intelligence. Both of these factors negatively affect officers’ commitment to the information 
warfighting occupation: “The problem is, intelligence is combat support… Information 
operations is operations… And when a person has been outside of the (Intel) MOS for a while, 
they’re probably not seen as a great Intel Officer because they’ve been doing IO for three 
years… All things being equal, who's got more intel experience? Probably the guys who've been 
doing the Intel piece." 
 
Because officers are often initially assigned to OIE based on the needs of the Marine Corps and 
not the interest of the Officer, commitment is understandably low in the beginning. Officers are 
pulled out of their primary community (MOS) and must adjust to a new set of community norms 
and practices and: “At the end of the whole slating process, all that, I got an intelligence job and 
I've enjoyed it ever since. I've excelled in that, and I'd like to continue to do that… Silver lining 
again is that there are potential IO billets for me that are near or collocated with intelligence 
units and groups, and, therefore, I feel like I can take this and what I'll be doing in the fleet and 
have it, at least tangentially, related to intelligence so that it’s helping my career path and I'm 
not losing the proficiency I have in the skills prior to coming here.” 
 
Differences between the response of enlisted and officers suggests that having a primary PsyOps 
MOS increases occupational commitment and supports the professionalization of this community 






Build a talent pipeline for hybrid warfare 
In discussing how to improve the effectiveness of OIE, it is important to think in terms of OIE’s 
role in conducting hybrid warfare. In a hybrid warfare environment, information operations 
should be integrated into most operational planning and execution. However, currently, 
Commanders often lack the knowledge and skills to incorporate information warfighting into 
their operations. To address this gap, OIE serves as the integrator of information warfighting 
capabilities for the Commander. Our research suggests that what is needed for the long term 
health of information operations is a phased approach to developing information warfighting 
expertise. In the immediate term, OIE should be professionalized and supported by targeted 





1. Professionalize OIE 
Based on the survey data of IO billets, there appears to be a strong correlation 
between promotability, occupational commitment, retention, and the development of 
expertise within OIE (see Figure 10). These correlations support the theory that the 
degree to which Marines perceive they are promotable drives occupational commitment to 
information warfighting, which in turn drives their desire to remain in information warfighting, 
which impacts the time available for developing information warfighting expertise. To support 
the short-term development of information warfighting expertise, OIE leadership should create a 





The first step, professionalizing the OIE workforce, can help to grow information warfighting 
expertise in the Marine Corps. Participants from outside the core IRC’s described how 







Promotability is ssential to increasing Retention & Ex ertise












building	up	the	other	guys	too.”	  Promotion barriers and the billeting process are key factors 
limiting the professionalization of OIE. 
 
The lack of a primary MOS (PMOS) in the IO billet, difficulties making lateral transfers, 
conflicting promotion criteria, and overlapping IRC’s all lead to short tenures for OIE personnel. 
Promotion in the Marine Corps is based on an officer going through a number of wickets related 
to their PMOS: “When it comes to officers, if he needs to go to a PME or he hasn't been a 
Company Commander yet or he hasn't been an Executive Officer, or he hasn't been an 
Operations Officer. He needs to hit all these wickets if he wants to be an O6 one day." IO 
officers are taken out of this cycle and believe they have fewer promotion opportunities. Ill-
defined and overlapping information warfighting IRC’s also makes promotion difficult. For 
instance, even though Intel seems to be closely related to IO, working in IO does not increase the 
likelihood of promotion within the Intel PMOS: “Well, this guy's been outside of his MOS for a 
while, he's probably not a great Intel Officer because he's been doing IO for three years. That 
could be a problem when he gets back into his primary MOS because when we want him to be an 
Intelligence Battalion Commander, his peers who have been doing the intel cookie cutter route, 
they've been doing Intel, he's being doing IO. All things being equal, who's got more Intel 
experience? Probably the guy who's been doing the Intel piece.” The confusion over how the 
IRC’s are connected within OIE impacts commitment to the profession and can result in stove-
piping of the sub-specialties: “Right now, some people think Electronic Warfare should fall 
under cyber. But 95% of your Electronic Warfare is done via radio waves. Cyber has no place in 
that. And right now, Electronic Warfare is an act of war.”  
 
The billeting process also makes it difficult to develop within an IO MOS. A combination of 
small force size and the individuals’ lack of control over their own professional development 
leads to potential mismatches between the needs of the Marine Corps’ and a Marine’s skills. 
Having adequate inventory makes it easier to meet the needs of the Marine Corps: “For an 
enlisted, it’s not very difficult. It's a lot easier to massage and manage enlisted talent 
management. Because the enlisted force is so large, they're a lot more malleable. So, I can move 
enlisted Marines around a lot easier.” For officers however, the OIE force size limits the 
number of available officers and this in turn limits effectiveness: “We don’t have the structure. 
We don’t have the inventory. And we mitigate that by making it a collateral duty for somebody. 
And that doesn’t do it justice… you can’t provide this capability to a Commander at an 
acceptable level.” In addition, both Monitors and the receiving commands struggle with 
matching capable Marines with information warfighting assignments: “That’s part of the broken 
part of the system—the communication between the Monitor who is deciding that this type of 






Professionalizing the workforce requires improvements to billeting and promotion opportunities.  
The billeting process can be improved by better communicating the value and requirements of an 
information warfighting professional to Monitors, the Commandant's Career Education Board, 
and potential OIE personnel. To improve promotability, the Marine Corps should consider 
creating a PMOS in the IO billet and instituting alternative promotion processes, such as lateral 
transfers, mid-level civilian entry, and career intermissions.  
 
2. Create multiple talent pipelines for OIE 
Because of the complexity of hybrid warfare and the diversity of information 
warfighting functions, it is important to develop skills across a range of 
competencies. The second step in strengthening the functioning of OIE is to build the technical, 
synchronizing, and leadership skills of OIE personnel. Unfortunately, 71% of the IO designated 
personnel we surveyed felt that their MOS training did not prepare them for work in IO. Officers 
that we interviewed felt that their formal education lacked a well-balanced approach to 
information warfighting skill development: “Our exposure is limited to the technical aspects of 
IO. We've had a few classes that have introduced the different systems thinking approaches and 
different methods of influence but having not seen it in practice, I don’t think I'd be able to 
synergistically combine everything.”  
 
For OIE, this ‘synergy’ requires the ability to synchronize IRC’s, provide specialized expertise, 
and lead without formalized lines of authority. Expecting all of these skills in one individual is 
both unrealistic and ineffective.27 We can see the unrealistic expectations play out when we look 
at the perceived expertise of IO professionals: “Other than maybe an 0550, the IO Planners are 
woefully under-trained and under-experienced. Information Operations is not a specialty, but an 
umbrella term which mis-matches a generalist planner with specialty capabilities.” 
 
Synchronizers play an important role in information warfighting and the role requires more than 
just technical knowledge to be effective. Synchronizers require what the 2016 Marine Corps 
Operating Concept calls “a combination of creative thinking and advanced technology.”28 Using 
creativity to rapidly sense, act, and mobilize in uncertain environments is what scholars call an 
“entrepreneurial mindset.”29 And, this mindset requires more than cognitive knowledge in a 
field; it requires the ability to be cognitively adaptable. Cognitive adaptability requires a set of 
inter-related mental processes that are known as ‘metacognition.’ This ability to “think about 
thinking” is a type of critical thinking that allows one to incorporate feedback from a dynamic 
and uncertain environment and turn it into adaptable decision-making processes. This 
adaptability is what is required of information warfighting synchronizers in a VUCA world.  
 
OIE talent management should support the development of agile ‘Synchronizers’ by developing 
human and conceptual skills and by providing opportunities for creativity, experimentation and 
on-the-job learning. 
 
Specialists are also needed to ensure the robustness of critical information warfighting systems 
and methods. Officers noted that even though the primary emphasis of OIE education is on 
developing technical expertise, their technical expertise was limited to learning engineering 
basics without the ability to continue their research or specialize in a technical field “In the Air 
Force, if you have a really good idea, they’re going to promote you and you’re going to have 
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your own staff, and you’re going to work on this problem for the next, you know, three years… 
the Marine Corps would just be like, ‘All right, that’s cool, but we’re going to send you to 
recruiting duty in Texas.’” In addition, there is often a mismatch between the education offered 
and the required needs of the billet assignments: “They’ll tell us that we’re supposed to be the 
technical experts, but that doesn't match the force structure in which they’re putting us in the 
billets.” These difficulties are in contrast to the enlisted personnel we spoke with, who felt that 
they were given extraordinary opportunities to develop their specialized skills: “It’s been a great 
experience to test my knowledge in engineering and physics, They’ve let me design things, and 
then they’ve built it, and then I’ve talked to my MOS field at the schoolhouse and I’ve given them 
all the information I’ve learned.”  
 
OIE talent development programs should provide opportunities for employees who are pursuing 
specialized fields and should include career development paths for research and development, 
and IRC specialization.  
 
Competent leaders are the last essential element for developing OIE competency. This is 
especially important in an environment where there are no official lines of authority. In OIE, 
information warfighting practitioners have to coordinate and plan without having the tasking 
authority: “It is understood that an IO Officer cannot 'direct' the IRCs, and this reduces their 
effectiveness… IO should have more authority to integrate IRCs and maximize achieving the 
commander's intent.” Leading without the ability to command requires the ability to influence 
others: “You need to be able to say, ‘Hey, this is what I need you to do and this is where and 
when I need you to do it, and this is how it works in the greater whole and the greater good so it 
makes sense to them, they’re doing it for a purpose. And then they understand how to shift if 
needed.”  
 
Talent development in OIE should include on-going education in leadership fundamentals, 
including human behavior, interpersonal relations, motivation, and communication. This will 
help OIE leaders develop better information warfighting plans, communicate better, work more 
cooperatively, and resolve conflicts faster.30 
 
We’ve discussed how a multiple competency model is critical in increasing the effectiveness and 
efficiency of OIE operations. CDR Schulz, in his article on “Developing Naval Officers to Lead in 
the Converged Cyberspace and Electromagnetic Spectrum Domains”31, lays out a pathway for 
developing these competencies that builds an officer’s expertise throughout their career. Labeled 
the ‘Pi-shaped Officer’, this multi-dimensional officer has a specialized expertise in a core 
competency (e.g., technology or IRC’s) and depth of knowledge in leadership. CDR Schulz 
suggests that these Pi-shaped Officers are built through a talent management process that builds 
expertise throughout an Information Officer’s career and combines ongoing training and 
experiential learning (see Figure 11). The model shows how OIE can develop internal leadership 






However, several participants noted that there are some downsides to restricting IO to a single 
organization, such as OIE. For that reason, we also recommend taking a long term approach to 
the development of information warfighting skills where these skills are folded into the 
leadership development of Marine Corps officers.  
 
3. Integrate information warfighting into the command structure  
Several participants cautioned that the underlying function of information 
warfighting has always existed and that the new OIE may be an added layer that 
increases bureaucracy and duplication. These participants noted that Commanders 
have always filled the role of integrator, relying on subordinates for detailed technical and 
specialized knowledge: “The Commander's decision-making ability has always been affected 
by his ‘cabinet’ members; they always select people with certain skills. Those people select 
people underneath them to give them certain abilities and understanding of areas that they need 
to focus in. The same thing is still happening today.”  
 
Looking forward to where hybrid warfare is fully integrated into battle planning, it will be 
essential and beneficial to have information warfighting more fully integrated into the skill sets 
of all Marine leaders. Incorporating these skills into other MOS has already shown some 
benefits: “When they leave here (OIE), they stay engaged back in their original MOS. If the 
guy’s an Intel Officer out in Camp Pendleton, he takes IO with him out to Pendleton, and he 
continues to incorporate that into his planning out there.”  
 
A long term plan for integrating information warfighting into leadership training would be to 
incorporate it into major exercises, planning processes, and leadership development early in 
every officer’s career: “If you catch an officer when he's a Lieutenant at TBS and tell him that it's 
part of the planning process and show him what it does in the planning process and how it's 
valuable to him, then as he becomes that Company Commander and then that Battalion 
Commander, you know, it's with him. It's engrained in him, just like any other skill.” By building 
information warfighting into TTP’s, regular training, exercises, and leadership development, you 
can increase the inventory for OIE and expand information warfighting capability in the Marine 
Corps. Instead of ‘everyman a rifleman’ create ‘every occupation, information’. 
 






Appendix A: Research Approach and Methods 




Research Approach and Methods  
This mixed method study answered the following questions: What are the drivers of 





To answer these questions, the research team conducted interviews, followed by a literature 
review, and survey of Marines with experience in IO. The NPS and USMC Institutional Review 
Boards (IRB) approved the study. The study followed an iterative approach whereby initial 
phases of the research informed subsequent phases. Initial analysis of the interviews informed 
the literature review, the literature review elaborated the interview findings, and the survey 
confirmed the findings with a broader sample.  
 
  
• Collect, analyze, and evaluate 
information; estimate the 
operational situation; and 
formulate, coordinate, execute 
approved intelligence actions, 
operations, and activities. The 
specialties include  
counterintelligence, imagery 
interpretation, geographic 
intelligence and human intelligence.
Intelligence (02)
• Develops MISO plans, advises the 
commander, supports forward 
deployed.  Analyzes target 
audiences, evaluates effects, and 
knows MISO techniques.  




or MISO (PsyOps) (0521)
• Design, installation, 
interconnection, and operation and 
maintenance of communication 
networks and information systems 
used to transmit information and 
data including telephone, switching, 
radio, cryptographic, computer, and 
Cyber Network systems,
Communications (06)
• Collect, process and analyze data to 
produce and disseminate 
intelligence. Set up,maintain, and 
operate electronic equipment, and 
prepare intelligence. Includes 
Signals Intelligence, Electronic 
Warfare, Computer Network 
Operations, and Special Intelligence 
Communications capabilities.
Signals Intelligence (26)
• Collects and analyzes data related 
to key public’s awareness, 
attitudes, opinions and enables 
effective communication with key 
publics in order to build 
understanding, credibility, trust, 
and mutually beneficial 
relationships that contribute to the 
achievement of operational and 
Service objectives
Public Affairs (43)
• Operation and management of 
combat camera (ComCam) in the 
areas of imagery acquisition 
(photography, videography and 
imagery manipulation), imagery 
management (imagery editing, 





Interview Data Collection  
The research team conducted 12 in-depth interviews. The interviews lasted approximately 40 
minutes each and were recorded and transcribed resulting in 215 pages of text. Participants were 
selected using purposeful sampling and included various job titles, tenure, and rank (shown below). 
 
  

























Combat Camera Communications Cyber Intelligence
Civil Affairs Logistics MISO (PsyOps) Pilot
Public Affairs Signals Intelligence Student Other
Time in Marines
4-8 yrs. 8-10 yrs. 10 yrs.+
Rank
O3-4 E4+ O5-6 Civilian
Time in IO
0-1 yrs. 1-2 yrs. 2-4 yrs.




The research team analyzed the interview transcripts using thematic analysis with Dedoose 
qualitative analysis software. We began with initial codes drawn from our familiarity with the 
literature and allowed additional codes to emerge. We initially read all of the transcripts to 
become familiar with the data. After coding each interview, the team then compared the coded 
segments within and across each participant and grouped the codes into thematic categories. We 
then conducted a literature review and integrated the themes from the interviews with findings 
from the general literature.  
 
Literature Review 
We selected studies to include in the literature review based on the themes from the interviews, 
focusing on research on best practices in talent management for technical professions. Key 







Community and retention 

























Interview Thematic Analysis 
The analysis and literature review resulted in the final themes and sub-themes described in this 
report. The Table below shows the final themes with examples of coded text. 
Theme Example 
Commitment 
Affective “I mean, the reason I struck around here is, I truly think it's a cool field. I mean, you can do so many things differently 
than the kinetic Marine Corps, you know, thing of dropping bombs and blowing stuff up. You know, it's just another 
way to attack a problem” 
Continuance “So, the story of how I got to the Marine Corps Information Operations Center is less a function of information 
operations, or OIE, and more a function of my family situation, kind of career path trajectory timing.” 
Normative “Hey, my thing at the end of the day is, I joined the military, I am still going to be working as hard at these things as I 
was in my previous command as I will be in my next command.” 
Identity 
Calling “I got an official engineering title without a degree. If that didn't happen, I could still be a service technician or an 
associate engineer anywhere with my skill set and my knowledge base. So, it helped me go up one level, but the 
knowledge that I had was already there.” 
Career control “So, like most Marines, most enlisted Marines in this command, who have been here for over three or four years, many 
of us are voluntold.” 
Role clarity “You've got officers and enlisted doing the same thing because they think they're running the show because that's what 
IO practitioners are led to believe is that  you're the integrator.” 
Environment 
Culture “And many times, some of the deployments, the Marines are providing tangible output to their actions. So, they're 




“I mean, you can say OIE all day long, but I challenge you to define it. And then I further you to challenge you to say, 
"Okay, tell me the differences between OIE and IO."  
Warfighting 
goals 
“You know, sitting there pulling a trigger, you're affecting something downrange a single thing at that time. If you're 
doing information operations, you have a broad effect and a great deal more effect-- you can avoid the fight to begin 
with just based on perception of  you know, they're perception of us and what they think of us. You feel that you have 




Community “We are not going to accumulate a community of interest if people come here for three years and then rotate back out 
to their primary MOS” 
Pipeline “So it would be a transition where once an individual comes here, you would transition them to the new military 
occupational specialty, and then they would go serve on a staff, do some kind of B billet, go to their required 
professional military education school, and then come back again to the information operations side of the house. 
Because now you have some form of continuity.” 
Professionalism “At the end of the day, if you want to professionalize an OIE professional and manage that talent over the lifecycle of 
that Marine's career you need to build on it over time and also saying, "Hey, you might have experienced it, but here's 
some lessons learned from the most recent things."  And then that Marine applies those lessons learned and builds on 
those experiences” 
Retention “Yeah. Plus,  if I go to NSA and somebody offers me a pretty lucrative deal to get out and join them or something, I 
might consider that.” 
Skill development 
Aptitude “So, you know, not everybody is going to have the prereqs to be a tech IO guy or gal and be able to grasp Electronic 
Warfare concepts. And not everybody is going to have the right prerequisites to understand human psychology to the 
point that you probably need it.” 
Education “I've seen probably, minimum, 50 other courses that people have said, you know, "Hey, this course used to be great," 
you know. We used a lot of the army's stuff because they're close.” 
Experience “But having not seen it in practice I  like, personally, I just haven't the kind of exposure where I think I'd be able to 
accurately define like how you could synergistically combine everything. “  
Knowledge 
sharing 
“There's nothing worse than asking a question and nobody having an answer.“ 
Required skills 
Critical Thinking “And I think that's helped me. The critical thinking, looking at something from the "Red Cell" Perspective, from the 
enemy's perspective, to understand how these networks work, how these systems of systems work has helped me so 
far and once we get to our fleet tours.” 
Human 
understanding 
“The big skills and qualities I think you need are, one, in understanding other people, good emotional intelligence to 




“Okay, I got my Commander's intent. Now, what are the tools at my disposal?  Understanding enough of those tools 
and how to employ them or at least who to go ask to employ them.” 
Integration “We did some really good stuff in Iraq between, you know, Electronic Warfare and Deception and the Public Affairs and 
the Psychological Operations. Working those four together really proved effective in places and really put adversary 
forces at a disadvantage.” 
 
Survey Data Collection and Analysis  
The research team recruited survey participants through an email sent to Marines currently 
holding relevant MOSs in information warfighting. Marines returned a total of 159 completed 
surveys, representing a response rate of 21%. On average, respondents had served on active duty 
for 13.56 years. The average tenure in information warfighting was 19.47 months, with 52% of 
respondents being IRC and 4% specifically in PsyOps. Officers comprise 83.4% and enlisted 
16.6% of the sample respectively.  
The research team performed quantitative analysis using IBM SPSS Statistics 26. The 
researchers conducted and used the following in the analysis: descriptive statistics, correlational 
analysis, comparison of means, and mediated regression. Correlations are displayed below. 
 











Retention Retention 2 Current 
Expertise 
Promotability 1 .488** .415** .262** .344** .298** 
Affective Occupational 
Commitment 




.415** .834** 1 .703** .457** .402** 
Retention .262** .687** .703** 1 .471** .356** 
Current Expertise .298** .391** .402** .356** 0.136 1 
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    Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
  0 36 23.1 23.1 
  1 2 1.3 24.4 
  2 2 1.3 25.6 
  3 3 1.9 27.6 
  4 6 3.8 31.4 
  5 3 1.9 33.3 
  6 11 7.1 40.4 
  7 1 0.6 41.0 
  8 3 1.9 42.9 
  9 2 1.3 44.2 
  10 1 0.6 44.9 
  11 2 1.3 46.2 
  12 9 5.8 51.9 
  13 1 0.6 52.6 
  14 2 1.3 53.8 
  15 6 3.8 57.7 
  16 3 1.9 59.6 
  18 5 3.2 62.8 
  20 2 1.3 64.1 
  22 1 0.6 64.7 
  24 11 7.1 71.8 
  26 2 1.3 73.1 
  27 1 0.6 73.7 
  28 1 0.6 74.4 
  30 2 1.3 75.6 
  31 1 0.6 76.3 
  34 1 0.6 76.9 
  36 16 10.3 87.2 
  38 1 0.6 87.8 
  40 2 1.3 89.1 
  44 1 0.6 89.7 
  48 1 0.6 90.4 
  52 1 0.6 91.0 
  60 6 3.8 94.9 
  67 1 0.6 95.5 
  72 1 0.6 96.2 
  75 1 0.6 96.8 
  78 1 0.6 97.4 
  79 1 0.6 98.1 
  88 1 0.6 98.7 
  96 1 0.6 99.4 
  148 1 0.6 100.0 
















































  Frequency Prepared Cumulative Percent 
1 30 19.6 19.6 
2 43 28.1 47.7 
3 36 23.5 71.2 
4 29 19.0 90.2 
5 15 9.8 100.0 









High Expertise Others 
Personal Interactions 4.03 3.43 
Lessons Learned 4.32 3.95 
Formal Training 4.24 4.06 




1 2 3 4 5
Believe MOS training prepared them for current role




















High Expertise Other 
Organizational Commitment 3.6842 3.7094 
Occupational Commitment 3.1579 2.5302 
Affective Occupational Commitment 3.3289 2.6293 
Continuance Occupational Commitment 2.6447 2.0603 









Enlisted PsyOp Enlisted Non-PsyOp Officer 
IO will Enhance my career 4.14 3.68 3.42 



























Enlisted PsyOp Enlisted Non-PsyOp Officer
Career enhancement/harm
IO will Enhance my career






Promotability2_Hurt_Career_MC - Officers only 
  Frequency Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
1 49 37.7 37.7 
2 21 16.2 53.8 
3 24 18.5 72.3 
4 17 13.1 85.4 







   
Value Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
1.00 3 1.9 1.9 
2.00 7 4.5 6.5 
3.00 13 8.4 14.8 
4.00 16 10.3 25.2 
5.00 25 16.1 41.3 
6.00 24 15.5 56.8 
7.00 29 18.7 75.5 
8.00 22 14.2 89.7 
9.00 10 6.5 96.1 
10.00 6 3.9 100.0 
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Means IRC v. Non-IRC 
  IRC Non-IRC 
Desire 3.7519 3.5693 
Desire_Designated_PMOS 3.59 3.35 
Desire_Designated_Career_Path 3.67 3.51 
Desire_Build_Career_No_Fear 3.65 3.64 
Desire_IO_More_Valued_At_Top 3.96 3.71 
Desire_Better_Opp_4_Promo 3.89 3.65 
Promotability1_Enhance_Career_MC 3.68 3.27 
Promotability2_Hurt_Career_MC 2.34 2.51 
Promotability_ExternalEmployability 3.85 3.64 
Retention_IO1 3.36 3.07 
Retention_IO2_Reversed 4.03 3.88 
Retention_Marine1_Reversed 3.86 3.79 
Org_Com_Aff 3.5679 3.8200 
Occup_Com_Aff 2.8688 2.7200 
Occup_Com_Cont 2.3000 2.0867 
Occup_Com_Norm 3.1313 2.9467 
Occup_Com_Full 2.7667 2.5844 
Embeddedness 2.8856 2.6107 
PO_Fit 3.5192 3.3533 
PJ_Fit 4.1474 3.8667 
JobSat 3.57 3.11 
Meaningful_Work 3.0577 2.9133 
Calling_IO 3.0782 2.9333 
Calling_Marines 4.2107 4.4551 
Role_Identity 3.0063 2.8667 
Role_Conflict (high score is bad) 1.9937 2.5200 
Enrichment1_Emotional_Reversed 3.78 3.92 
Enrichment2_Development 3.90 3.81 
PCO 4.2667 4.2320 
PCO_SD 4.4321 4.3800 
PCO_VD 4.1564 4.1333 
QOL 3.8889 3.9041 
Relations 3.7688 4.0867 
Job_Perf 3.8397 3.7133 
Exp_Ess 4.3750 4.3867 
Exp_Dev_Personal_Interactions 3.78 3.37 
Exp_Dev_Lessons_Learned 4.19 3.88 
Exp_Dev_Formal_Training_Educ 4.08 4.11 
Exp_Dev_On_Job_Exp 4.69 4.61 
Exp_Current 6.09 5.73 
How_long_to_become_Expert 46.87 42.47 
MOS_Training_Preparedthem 2.92 2.47 
Means Enlisted v. Officer 
  Enlisted Officer 
Desire 3.9538 3.5992 
Desire_Designated_PMOS 3.85 3.4 
Desire_Designated_Career_Path 3.92 3.52 
Desire_Build_Career_No_Fear 3.88 3.59 
Desire_IO_More_Valued_At_Top 4.08 3.78 




Promotability2_Hurt_Career_MC 1.92 2.51 
Promotability_ExternalEmployability 4.31 3.63 
Retention_IO1 3.58 3.13 
Retention_IO2_Reversed 4.15 3.91 
Retention_Marine1_Reversed 3.62 3.88 
Org_Com_Aff 3.6538 3.6985 
Occup_Com_Aff 3.3462 2.6885 
Occup_Com_Cont 2.4615 2.1423 
Occup_Com_Norm 3.5577 2.9346 
Occup_Com_Full 3.1218 2.5885 
Embeddedness 3.1538 2.6727 
PO_Fit 3.5577 3.418 
PJ_Fit 4.3462 3.9414 
JobSat 3.69 3.28 
Meaningful_Work 3.2308 2.9453 
Calling_IO 3.3654 2.9402 
Calling_Marines 4.3846 4.3183 
Role_Identity 3.5192 2.8295 
Role_Conflict 2.2885 2.2364 
Enrichment1_Emotional_Reversed 3.77 3.87 
Enrichment2_Development 4.19 3.79 
PCO 4.3615 4.229 
PCO_SD 4.4615 4.4008 
PCO_VD 4.2949 4.1145 
QOL 3.9103 3.8941 
Relations 3.84 3.9427 
Job_Perf 4.0577 3.7227 
Exp_Ess 4.6026 4.3333 
Exp_Dev_Personal_Interactions 4.12 3.47 
Exp_Dev_Lessons_Learned 4.58 3.93 
Exp_Dev_Formal_Training_Educ 4.12 4.09 
Exp_Dev_On_Job_Exp 4.77 4.63 
Exp_Current 6.3846 5.8295 
How_long_to_become_Expert 52.32 43.08 
MOS_Training_Preparedthem 2.92 2.67 
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Means Expertise Hi v Lo 




Desire 4.0703 3.5457 
Desire_Designated_PMOS 3.86 3.35 
Desire_Designated_Career_Path 4.03 3.46 
Desire_Build_Career_No_Fear 4.05 3.53 
Desire_IO_More_Valued_At_Top 4.24 3.72 
Desire_Better_Opp_4_Promo 4.16 3.66 
Promotability1_Enhance_Career_MC 3.95 3.34 
Promotability2_Hurt_Career_MC 2.74 2.29 
Promotability_ExternalEmployability 4.18 3.64 
Retention_IO1 3.81 3.03 
Retention_IO2_Reversed 4.14 3.93 
Retention_Marine1_Reversed 3.68 3.87 
Org_Com_Aff 3.6842 3.7094 
Occup_Com_Aff 3.3289 2.6293 
Occup_Com_Cont 2.6447 2.0603 
Occup_Com_Norm 3.5 2.9009 
Occup_Com_Full 3.1579 2.5302 
Embeddedness 3.4474 2.5362 
PO_Fit 3.9054 3.3147 
PJ_Fit 4.5946 3.8147 
JobSat 4.11 3.12 
Meaningful_Work 3.7162 2.7802 
Calling_IO 3.8026 2.7593 
Calling_Marines 4.3219 4.3345 
Role_Identity 3.8026 2.681 
Role_Conflict 2.2105 2.2457 
Enrichment1_Emotional_Reversed 3.97 3.84 
Enrichment2_Development 4.45 3.66 
PCO 4.2421 4.2598 
PCO_SD 4.3816 4.4231 
PCO_VD 4.1491 4.151 
QOL 4.1622 3.8362 
Relations 4 3.931 
Job_Perf 4.5 3.5603 
Exp_Ess 4.5789 4.3391 
Exp_Dev_Personal_Interactions 4.03 3.43 
Exp_Dev_Lessons_Learned 4.32 3.95 
Exp_Dev_Formal_Training_Educ 4.24 4.06 
Exp_Dev_On_Job_Exp 4.84 4.59 
Exp_Current 8.5789 5.0598 
How_long_to_become_Expert 51.81 41.9 
MOS_Training_Preparedthem 3 2.61 
Means Expertise Hi v Lo 




Desire 4.2333 3.6497 
Desire_Designated_PMOS 4.17 3.45 
Desire_Designated_Career_Path 4.17 3.57 
Desire_Build_Career_No_Fear 4.33 3.63 
Desire_IO_More_Valued_At_Top 4.33 3.83 
Desire_Better_Opp_4_Promo 4.17 3.77 
Promotability1_Enhance_Career_MC 3.5 3.49 
Promotability2_Hurt_Career_MC 2.83 2.39 
Promotability_ExternalEmployability 4.5 3.74 
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